Cyber threat bulletin: Iranian cyber threat to Canada from Israel-Iran conflict

Overview of cyber threat to Canada from Iran

On June 13, 2025, the State of Israel (Israel) launched military strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). On June 22, 2025, the United States (U.S.) carried out precision airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

After the U.S. operation against Iran, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security warned of potential retaliatory cyber threat Cyber threatA threat actor, using the internet, who takes advantage of a known vulnerability in a product for the purposes of exploiting a network and the information the network carries. activity against U.S. critical infrastructure Critical infrastructureProcesses, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets, and services essential to the health, safety, security, or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected and interdependent within and across provinces, territories, and national borders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects, and significant harm to public confidence. and other U.S. entities by Iranian-affiliated cyber actors.Footnote 1

It is very unlikely that Canada’s critical infrastructure and other Canadian networks are a priority target for retaliatory Iranian cyber threat activity. Canada was not a party to the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran. However, we assess that Canada would likely be an indirect or collateral victim of Iranian cyber threat activity that is intended to target the U.S. In addition, Iran will likely continue to engage in cyber-enabled transnational repression against individuals in Canada that the Iranian regime considers a threat, especially those advocating for regime change in Iran.

Threat activity

  • Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat actors conduct disruptive cyber-enabled information operations to further Iran’s geopolitical objectives and the regime’s interests. Iran has developed a network of hacktivist personas and social media channels that exploit these disruptive events to intimidate Iran’s opponents and shape public opinion.Footnote 3
  • Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat actors opportunistically target poorly secured critical infrastructure (CI) networks and internet-connected devices around the world, including those associated with the water and energy sectors.Footnote 4 Iranian cyber threat actors have performed denial of services attacks, attempted to manipulate industrial control systems, and accessed networks to encrypt, wipe, and leak data.Footnote 5
  • Pro-Iran hacktivists conduct cyber threat activity against Iran’s rivals, but often overstate their impact. In response to the U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites, pro-Iran hacktivist groups claimed to have conducted distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against websites associated with the U.S. military, U.S. defence companies and U.S. financial institutions.Footnote 6
  • It is very unlikely that Canada’s critical infrastructure and other Canadian networks are a priority target for retaliatory cyber threat activity by Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat actors or pro-Iran hacktivists. However, Canada would likely be an indirect or collateral victim of Iranian cyber threat activity that is intended to target the U.S. This threat is elevated due to North American interconnectivity in key CI sectors, such as energy and transportation.
  • Iranian cyber-enabled transnational repression will likely remain a threat to Canada. Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat actors likely conduct cyber espionage against individuals in Canada that the Iranian regime considers a threat, such as political activists, journalists, and human rights advocates.Footnote 7 In the aftermath of the conflict, we assess that Iranian cyber threat actors will likely target opponents abroad, especially those advocating for regime change in Iran.Footnote 8
Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat group compromises Israeli-made devices

Between November 2023 and January 2024, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard GuardA gateway that is placed between two networks, computers, or other information systems that operate at different security levels. The guard mediates all information transfers between the two levels so that no sensitive information from the higher security level is disclosed to the lower level. It also protects the integrity of data on the higher level. Corps (IRGC) cyber unit using the persona CyberAv3ngers conducted a global campaign that targeted and defaced poorly secured, Israeli-made devices used in critical infrastructure. One victim was a municipal water authority in the U.S. that used default passwords.Footnote 2 This activity was likely conducted in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Characteristics of Iranian cyber threat activity

Compelling social engineering

Iranian cyber threat groups are particularly sophisticated in combining social engineering Social engineeringThe practice of obtaining confidential information by manipulation of legitimate users. A social engineer will commonly use the telephone or internet to trick people into revealing sensitive information. For example, phishing is a type of social engineering. with spear phishing Spear phishingThe use of spoofed emails to persuade people within an organization to reveal their usernames or passwords. Unlike phishing, which involves mass mailing, spear phishing is small-scale and well targeted. , using these efforts to target public officials and gain access to government networks and private sector organizations globally.Footnote 9 Iranian social engineering efforts focus on using professional interactions on social media platforms to gain information about organizations related to Iran’s political, economic and military interests, particularly in the aerospace, energy, defence, security, and telecommunications sectors. Footnote 9

Exploiting known vulnerabilities

Iranian cyber threat actors exploit known vulnerabilities to gain initial access to systems, and then leverage this access for follow on operations such as data exfiltration ExfiltrationThe unauthorized removal of data or files from a system by an intruder. or encryption EncryptionConverting information from one form to another to hide its content and prevent unauthorized access. , ransomware RansomwareA type of malware that denies a user's access to a system or data until a sum of money is paid. , and extortion.Footnote 10 Iranian cyber threat actors opportunistically identify targets using publicly available scanning tools to search for internet-exposed systems with vulnerable configurations, for example devices using default or weak passwords and without multi-factor authentication Multi-factor authenticationA tactic that can add an additional layer of security to your devices and account. Multi-factor authentication requires additional verification (like a PIN or fingerprint) to access your devices or accounts. Two-factor authentication is a type of multi-factor authentication. .Footnote 11

Disruptive and destructive cyber attacks

Iranian cyber threat actors typically conduct DDoS DDOSSee Distributed denial-of-service attack. attacks and website / device defacements to temporarily disrupt target networks. They also deploy ransomware and destructive wiper malware MalwareMalicious software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system, without the owner's consent. Common forms of malware include computer viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, and adware. and conduct hack-and-leak operations against compromised targets.Footnote 12

Useful resources

Refer to the following online resources for more information and useful advice and guidance.

Reports and advisories

Advice and guidance

About this document

Contact

For follow up questions or issues please Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Cyber securityThe protection of digital information, as well as the integrity of the infrastructure housing and transmitting digital information. More specifically, cyber security includes the body of technologies, processes, practices and response and mitigation measures designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access so as to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability. (Cyber Centre) at contact@cyber.gc.ca.

Assessment base and methodology

The key judgements in this assessment rely on reporting from multiples sources, both classified and unclassified. The judgements are based on the Cyber Centre’s knowledge and expertise in cyber security. Defending the Government of Canada’s information systems provides the Cyber Centre with a unique perspective to observe trends in the cyber threat environment, which also informs our assessments. CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate provides us with valuable insight into adversary behavior in cyberspace. While we must always protect classified sources and methods, we provide the reader with as much justification as possible for our judgements.

Our key judgements are based on an analytical process that includes evaluating the quality of available information, exploring alternative explanations, mitigating biases and using probabilistic language. We use terms such as “we assess” or “we judge” to convey an analytic assessment. We use qualifiers such as “possibly”, “likely”, and “very likely” to convey probability.

The contents of this document are based on information available as of June 27, 2025.

Estimative language

The chart below matches estimative language with appropriate percentages. these percentages are not derived via statistical analysis, but are based on logic, available information, prior judgements, and methods that increase the accuracy of estimates.

Long description immediately follows
Long description - Estimative language chart
  • 1 to 9%  Almost no chance
  • 10 to 24%  Very unlikely/very improbable
  • 25 to 39% Unlikely/improbable
  • 40 to 59% Roughly even chance
  • 60 to 74% Likely/probably
  • 75 to 89% Very likely/very probable
  • 90 to 99% Almost certainly
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